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Abstract
The specification and enforcement of network-wide poli-
cies in a single administrative domain is common in
today’s networks and considered as already resolved.
However, this is not the case for multi-administrative
domains, e.g. among different enterprises. In such sit-
uation, new problems arise that challenge classical so-
lutions such as PKIs, which suffer from scalability and
granularity concerns. In this paper, we present an ex-
tension to Group-Based Policy -a widely used network
policy language- for the aforementioned scenario. To
do so, we take advantage of a permissioned blockchain
implementation (Hyperledger Fabric) to distribute ac-
cess control policies in a secure and auditable manner,
preserving at the same time the independence of each
organization. Network administrators specify polices
that are rendered into blockchain transactions. A LISP
control plane (RFC 6830) allows routers performing the
access control to query the blockchain for authoriza-
tions. We have implemented an end-to-end experimen-
tal prototype and evaluated it in terms of scalability
and network latency.
1 Introduction
Group-Based Policy (GBP), or policy-based network-
ing [1] is a declarative approach to defining network be-
haviour. Network administrators specify network end-
points, groups of endpoints and their policies using a
high level language, which is later translated to net-
work configurations. One of these languages, GBP is
widely employed in the industry, for example in Open-
Stack’s Neutron network API [2]. It can define rules
between servers and clients, service chains, etc.
Until now, GBP has been conceived as a language
for a single administrative domain. In this paper, we
analyze if we can extend it to several administrative do-
mains, preserving at the same time their independence.
For example, we want to make it possible for an admin-
istrator in company B to allow a VPN connection from
a user in company A by simply typing:
createPolicy from=userA to=VPNserverB action=allow
Typically, there are two solutions for this scenario:
(i) manual, by means of issuing a digital certificate and
giving it to the users (so they use it later to authenti-
cate the connection), or (ii) leveraging structures based
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Figure 1: Global architecture.
on PKI systems, namely cross-domain certification or
bridge CA certificates [3]. These structures allow the
co-existence of several CAs and ensure mutual trust.
However, these approaches present some limitations
that have hindered their deployment. First of all, scal-
ability: in scenarios with thousands or tens of thou-
sands of users, the manual approach is unfeasible, and
cross-certificating N domains means -in the worst case-
issuing ∼ N2/2 certificates [3, 4]. Second, granularity:
it is not possible to define different policies for different
users without issuing more certificates, further affecting
scalability. Finally, management: PKIs are cumber-
some to manage, especially day-to-day operations like
adding and removing users, revocation (requires a CRL
subsystem) or key rollover.
With these limitations in mind, in this paper we
propose using a blockchain to overcome them. In
such blockchain, each organization defines its users
and resources, and specifies which users -from other
organizations- can access its resources. Upon an access
request, routers query the blockchain to verify autho-
rization (fig. 1).
Thanks to blockchain’s particular properties, we can
design an access control system that improves on several
of PKI’s limitations: (i) increased scalability: when we
establish a new relationship in a PKI, we have to cross-
certificate the new entity with the rest. In a blockchain,
however, we can directly reference previous transac-
tions/users. This reduces the number of required certifi-
cates (transactions in this case). (ii) improved granular-
ity and flexibility : since we can associate each resource
or user with a private key, we can alter its state without
affecting the rest. This includes both its validity and
other data, for example, we can assign different poli-
cies to different users. (iii) simpler management: the
transactional nature of blockchain makes management
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simpler: the aforementioned common operations (key
rollover, revocation) can be encoded as new transac-
tions, instead of requiring a dedicated subsystem, like
CRLs and manifests.
In this paper we present an architecture to support
this use-case, we describe a practical end-to-end imple-
mentation and evaluate its performance to demonstrate
its feasibility. Our results show that we can store thou-
sands of access polices with modest storage, and achieve
linear update times on a permissioned blockchain.
2 Why Blockchain?
Our use-case presents two particular characteristics: (i)
its participants have limited trust in each other, and (ii)
they want to retain full control over the access policies.
This is because in a multi-enterprise scenario: (i) com-
panies are not willing to leave access control to a third
party, and (ii) each company must be able to revoke
any access policy at any moment in time, respectively.
These requirements match the characteristics of any
blockchain. Regarding the first demand, its consen-
sus algorithm ensures that no single entity controls the
blockchain and avoids having to fully trust its partici-
pants. The second requirement is covered by the fact
that blockchain assets are controlled by their associated
private key owner, not by a centralized entity.
On the other hand, an approach like this is much
more complex in a classical PKI because it cannot ful-
fill the previous two requirements. The first one because
the CA is the single point of trust in the system, which
forces all participants to trust it. Furthermore, it can-
not meet the second as a consequence of the centralized
trust: the CA can unilaterally alter state by means of
certificate revocation.
As mentioned before, other PKI schemes could pro-
vide equivalent functionality, such as bridge CA certifi-
cates, but in this case the bridge CA certificate is still
a single point of trust, thus it is not significantly differ-
ent from a conventional CA. Cross-domain certification
may prove useful, however, it presents scalability limi-
tations because each new CA has to cross-certify with
all the existing ones.
In addition, a blockchain can alleviate this scalability
concerns: we can reduce the number of required certifi-
cates (transactions in this case), since a blockchain al-
lows directly referencing existing transactions, instead
of re-certifying with the PKI CA. In turn, this simpli-
fies the verification of the chain of authorizations, i.e.
it is not necessary to go up the CA, then down to the
cross-certificated one. Authorization emerges directly
from the originating organization.
Finally, thanks to emerging private blockchain plat-
forms we can provide a certain degree of privacy
for their users (as opposed to public blockchains like
Ethereum) and improve some of their performance met-
rics (sec. 3.2).
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Figure 2: Layered architecture.
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3 Architecture
We can describe our architecture as a three-layer system
(fig. 2):
Policy: an intent-driven interface allows adminis-
trators to specify users, resources and access policies.
These polices are rendered into blockchain transactions.
Blockchain: a blockchain stores all the information
and ensures its integrity and accuracy.
Network: routers access the blockchain via an API
to determine if a particular user can access a specific
resource. If the user is authorized, they retrieve authen-
tication information to establish a security association
and allow the connection.
The following sections provide details on each ele-
ment.
3.1 Policy interface
Administrators use a simple CLI, based on GBP, to per-
form management operations, such as creating/deleting
users, groups of users, policies and resources, as well as
querying the blockchain for specific policies, users, etc.
We have chosen GBP because it is widely adopted in
the industry [2] and its semantics align pretty well with
our use-case.
Specifically, we can accommodate our use case to
the OpenStack syntax simply re-using some of its com-
mands. For example, consider that organization B
wants to grant access to its internal database to Alice
from the Human Resources department of an external
organization A (figure 3). First, company A creates a
member for Alice:
gbp member-create alice
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Then, company B creates a group for company A’s
user and adds Alice into it:
gbp group-create dbaccess --add:orga.alice
It also creates the internal database as a member:
gbp member-create internalDB
Finally, organization B creates the policy associated
to its database and company A’s user, allowing access
from the group dbaccess to its member internalDB :
gbp policy-rule-create external-human-res
--src:dbaccess --dst:internalDB --actions allow
The GBP syntax can be extended with more options,
for example, adding a one week timeout to Alice’s mem-
bership in the internalDB group:
gbp group-create dbaccess --add:orga.alice --timeout
1w
This custom logic can be easily implemented thanks
to the ability of some blockchains to run smart con-
tracts.
3.2 Blockchain
In this section we discuss two major design decisions we
took for our blockchain.
Participants: We believe that a private blockchain
(only authorized members can access it) fits better in
this scenario than a public, mainly because its partici-
pants are not willing to make their access policies pub-
lic. Communicating access policies only to a group of
companies is sufficient for correct operation.
Consensus algorithm: We argue that a BFT pro-
tocol suits our use case, due to the following reasons:
(i) Security: classical BFT protocols such as XFT [5]
or BFT-SMART [6] offer proven security guarantees, as
opposed to PoW or PoS algorithms, some of which lack
a formal security analysis or a mature implementation.
(ii) the access-control PKI of the private chain can be
re-used in the BFT protocol, since they require some
kind of node authentication. (iii) Higher throughput:
BFT algorithms typically reach consensus faster than
PoW or PoS, thus increasing the amount of transactions
per second. (iv) Immediate finality: in a BFT proto-
col, when a transaction has been added in the chain,
it will never be removed. On the contrary, a Bitcoin
fork prevents immediate finality, and (v) We can avoid
well-known PoW/PoS drawbacks, e.g. high energy con-
sumption or limited throughput.
Finally, it should be noted that BFT-based chains
suffer from scalability concerns, i.e., they cannot scale
to as many users as well-know PoW or PoS chains like
Bitcoin (in the order of millions). However, this is not
our case: a chain with hundreds or even tenths of com-
panies would be perfectly functional.
3.3 Network
In order to perform the access control, we have chosen
the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP, RFC 6830).
LISP is a request-response protocol that allows the com-
munication of control and data planes. In our scenario,
routers can easily retrieve the blockchain access control
Blockchain
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Figure 4: Typical architecture workflow.
policies from the control plane with minimal modifi-
cation of the base protocol. For this particular use-
case, LISP is conceptually equivalent to OpenFlow [7].
Hence, we can use other protocols for this task, such as
the aforementioned OpenFlow or P4 Runtime [8].
In a nutshell, we store the access policies in the LISP
control plane and update them through the blockchain.
LISP-enabled routers query the control plane to deter-
mine if a particular user can access the requested re-
source. Users authenticate to the router by means of
including their signature in the LISP control plane mes-
sages (Map Request and Map Reply).
3.4 Typical Workflow
Fig. 4 presents an example of the typical workflow in
this architecture, in which two companies set up a se-
cure connection from User A of company A to Resource
B located in company B.
1. At setup time, administrators from both compa-
nies store the required information in the chain.
Company A adds User A and its public key. Com-
pany B details its resource (Resource B) and grants
access to company A’s user (A > B). They use a
CLI similar to the example in sec. 3.1.
2. Company A assigns User A its credentials (public-
private keypair), with the public key being the one
in the blockchain.
3. When User A wants to connect to Resource B, it
sends a LISP control message to the LISP Control
Plane. The message is signed by User A.
4. The LISP Control Plane verifies the signature and
checks the access policy against the blockchain.
5. If they are correct, it sends a reply message to Com-
pany B’s LISP Router.
6. The LISP router sends a reply message with the
cryptorgraphic material for data plane encryption,
in order to establish a security association with
User A. This message is encrypted with User A’s
public key.
3
7. The LISP router and User A start a secure con-
nection, e.g. with LISP-CRYPTO (RFC 8061) or
other VPN protocols (L3VPN or equivalent).
4 Implementation
We have built an end-to-end prototype encompassing
the three components of the aforementioned architec-
ture: GBP interface, Blockchain, and Network. It is
available as open-source code1.
4.1 GBP Command Line
We designed a CLI inspired on GBP commands that
allows the creation/deletion/retrieval of users, groups of
users, resources and access policies, highly similar to the
examples in sec. 3.1. For example create resource
creates a new resource for the organization. Additional
options in the commands specify the IP address of the
resource, the public key of a user, etc.
4.2 Blockchain
Our prototype is based on the Hyperledger project
(HL), an open-source permissioned blockchain imple-
mentation. Specifically, we have chosen its Fabric
[9] framework because of its maturity, flexibility and
business-orientation. Moreover, thanks to Fabrics’s
channels, we can establish private communications
among sub-sets of companies if privacy is a strong con-
cern. In this section we summarize the different config-
uration parameters and implementation details of our
prototype in the HL Fabric framework.
4.2.1 Assets
We defined the following elements in the chain:
Users: Source endpoints, identified by a public key
and including other information: originating organiza-
tion, IP address, name and department.
Departments: A group of users within an organiza-
tion, identified by department name and their belonging
organization2.
Resources: Destination endpoints, identified by an
IP address and the associated organization.
Policies: Access control lists that grant access ei-
ther from a source endpoint (user) or from a group
of users (department) to a destination endpoint (re-
source). They are identified by a composite key (source-
destination). Typically, the source endpoint is a user
or department of another organization and the destina-
tion is a resource of the issuing organization. Policies
can contain other information, such as the time frame
in which the connection is allowed or an expiry time.
4.2.2 Membership Service Provider
Each organization is identified by a MSP (Fabric’s PKI
for blockchain nodes).
1https://github.com/JordiSubira/DGBP
2They identify groups of users in order to simultaneously cre-
ate policies for several users.
4.2.3 Chaincode
We imposed as a global constraint that only the orga-
nization that creates an asset can alter its state (e.g.
delete, associate with another asset, etc). We enforce
this by binding all assets to their respective MSP, and
rejecting any modification from a non-owner MSP.
In addition, any organization within the same HL
channel can query information about any asset of any
organization in the chain.
4.2.4 Endorsement policy
In our implementation, all members have to endorse
any transaction. However, other schemes are possible
thanks to Fabric’s flexibility. Depending on the level
of trust among the participating organizations and the
particular use-case, we can adjust the minimum number
of endorsements. Some examples are: half + 1 of the
members, 2f + 1 valid signatures out of n endorsers
(assuming f faulty endorsers and n > 3f), or AND/OR
syntax (member A OR members (B,C,D)), etc.
4.2.5 Ordering Service
We leveraged the SOLO ordering service (i.e. a central-
ized orderer), so we could ease development. However,
in a production setup Apache Kafka could be a good fit,
because it can tolerate several faulty or disconnected
nodes.
In scenarios with low trust among participants, BFT
ordering services can be easily plugged thanks to Fab-
ric’s modular design. However, we believe that a CFT
algorithm is enough for this use-case since a double-
spend does not make sense here3. In addition, HL’s
endorse-order-validate transaction lifecycle offers a va-
riety of mechanisms to prevent or detect misbehavior.
4.3 OpenOverlayRouter Software
Router
In order to effectively perform access control, we took
advantage of an open-source LISP implementation,
Open Overlay Router (OOR [10]). We made a slight
modification to its Tunnel Router mode: when it re-
ceives a Map Request packet, it queries Hyperledger
with the source and destination endpoints, via an ad-
hoc API. Hyperledger checks if the pair of (source, des-
tination) is allowed to establish a connection and noti-
fies OOR. If they can connect, OOR then responds to
the source with a Map Reply message, otherwise takes
no action. This way, unauthorized users do not receive a
response in the form of a Map Reply and do not know
where to connect. Of course, a production setup re-
quires additional security mechanisms, as outlined in
section 3.3.
3n.b. in a CFT environment some attacks, such as censoring
a transaction, may become feasible
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Table 1: Experimental Setup
Number of organizations 4
Typical key + value size 32 bytes
Number of channels 1
State database LevelDB key-value store
Endorsement Policy
AND (Org1,Org2,
Org3,Org4)
Ordering Service SOLO
Block timeout 100 ms
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Number of elements (policies and users)
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Figure 5: Hyperledger CouchDB query latency.
5 Experimental Evaluation
5.1 Scenario
We set up an experimental scenario on a PC running
Ubuntu 16.06 and a quad-core Intel i5 CPU 650 @
3.20GHz. Table 1 summarizes HL parameters during
the experiment. Thanks to the Docker containeriza-
tion of HL, we could emulate 4 organizations, each with
2 peers, all in the same PC. We artificially generated
around 1 million policies and users to evaluate the read
latency, and added at most 15 endorsers to estimate the
write latency.
5.2 Results
We carried out several experiments on our implemen-
tation to characterize its performance and have an un-
derstanding of its scalability.
Read latency: Fig. 5 presents the average query
time for different number of elements in the chain. In
this case the state DB was CouchDB4. We can see that
it revolves around 40 ms regardless of the number of
elements, because Couch DB is a key-value store (these
type of databases present constant query latency). It
should be noted that the query performs exact matches
of pairs of source and destination IP addresses, and that
future work should also support longest-prefix match-
ing.
Write latency: Fig. 6 plots the time required to
add a new user depending on the number of endorsers
in the network. As we can see, the latency grows lin-
early with the number of endorsers, because each new
endorser is an additional signature that the issuer has
to verify (the current HL implementation makes this
4HL allows using both LevelDB and Couch DB as state DB,
with similar performance.
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Figure 6: Latency to add a new user for different num-
ber of endorsers.
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Figure 7: Chain size vs. number of transactions, in a
setup with four endorsers.
verification sequentially). This result is in line with in
a recent benchmark of the HL platform [11].
Chain size: We were also interested in the chain
size, i.e. required storage. Figs. 7 and 8 show the
total chain size depending on the number of transac-
tions and endorsers, respectively. As expected, in both
cases the size grows linearly with the number of trans-
actions or endorsers (in the latter case because more
endorsers mean more signatures per transaction). We
can see that these situations require very modest stor-
age. Thus, we can safely assume that scenarios with a
considerable amount of participants (e.g. 1k endorsers
would demand ∼25 GB) or a long transaction history
(1M transactions take up ∼10 GB) can be easily sup-
ported.
Network latency: Fig. 9 presents the query time
CDF of a LISP control plane node (Map Server) storing
1k, 10k or 100k pairs of source, destination pairs. In
other words, given a source node, how long does it take
to find the authorized destination node(s). Since this
test was performed in a local network, we consider the
communication delay negligible.
We can see that the majority of the queries are com-
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Figure 8: Chain size depending on the number of re-
quired endorsers (5k transactions in the chain).
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Figure 9: CDF for LISP Map Server query delay for 1k,
10k or 100k pairs of source, destination nodes.
pleted in less than 0.35 ms, roughly two orders of mag-
nitude below the HL database delay. This is mainly due
to two reasons: (i) the Map Server is implemented in C
(whereas the queries in fig. 5 go through HL’s Node.js
API, CouchDB and back) and (ii) data is stored in a
Patricia Trie, a tree optimized for prefix queries. In
addition, the delay is independent of the number of el-
ements thanks again to the Patricia Trie: the delay de-
pends on the length of the elements (source endpoints,
IP addresses in our implementation), not the number.
5.3 Discussion
The previous results demonstrate that the proposed
system can easily scale to meet the demands of a feder-
ation of several organizations. Table 2 outlines several
metrics and their requirements in terms of scalability.
On one hand, both the read and network latencies can
support high query rates. The read latency presents
a constant response time regardless of the number of
elements in the chain (in case of exact matches), and the
network server storing the access policies, linear with
the length of identifiers.
On the other hand, the write latency can suffer if we
have a large amount organizations in the same block-
chain. However, it is not as critical as the read latency
because we can tolerate a delay up to several of seconds
when adding a new user.
Finally, the chain size obviously depends linearly on
the number of transactions, but also on the number
of endorsers. This last relationship puts an additional
strain on scalability, because it affects both chain size
and write latency. There is a tradeoff here between
a small number of endorsers (small write latency and
chain size, but more centralized trust in a narrow set of
participants), and a large number of them (higher write
latency and size but more distributed trust). Thus, spe-
cial consideration should be put in the number of en-
dorsers and the endorsement policy to achieve an equi-
librium between a tolerable write latency and the ex-
pected number of endorsements.
Table 2: Scalability Analysis
Read latency
constant
(exact match)
Write latency linear w.r.t. number of org.
Chain size
linear w.r.t. number of
transactions and endorsers
Network latency
linear w.r.t. identifier size
+ propagation delay
6 Related Work
There are already several proposals in the literature [12]
that leverage blockchains for a wide range of network
applications, such as mesh networks [13], IP addresses
[14], etc.
The most closely related work to ours is [15], which
implements Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
policies over the Bitcoin blockchain. It presents three
main differences with respect to our work: (i) it fo-
cuses on access control for individual users, unlike our
organization-based approach, (ii) it allows transferring
access control rights between users, and (iii) does not
consider using a private chain or a different consen-
sus algorithm. Hadi [16] proposes a data distribution
system in which the blockchain is the data persistence
layer, but is also user-centric and more oriented towards
data storage and messaging services rather than net-
working.
Finally, there is also a growing body of work on
blockchain-based access control for IoT: [17] leverages
a blockchain to store access permissions for IoT devices
with a strong emphasis on key management and distri-
bution. [18] also provides authentication, authorization
and auditing for IoT but separates them in four inde-
pendent blockchains, and is generic enough to support
a wide range of access control models typical of IoT,
while in this paper we concentrate on a specific lan-
guage, GBP.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented, implemented and eval-
uated an architecture to support access control in cross-
domain communications. In order to reduce the bur-
den on network administrators, the front-end builds on
GBP, a well-known intent-driven language. A permis-
sioned blockchain distributes network polices, and helps
overcome drawbacks of conventional solutions while at
the same time maintains the independence of each orga-
nization. Our experimental evaluation shows that this
design can easily scale to -at least- tenths of organiza-
tions with modest storage requirements.
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